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COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS-
DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF A RACIAL RESTRICTIVE COVENANT, Bar-
rows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249 (1953).
Plaintiff brought an action for damages for breach of a
covenant prohibiting the use or occupancy of real property by
non-Caucasians. Plaintiff alleged that defendant and another
conveyed land bound by the agreement, without including the
restrictive covenant in the conveyance as required by the agree-
ment, and with knowledge that the land was to be occupied by
members of a non-Caucasian race. The defendant's demurrer was
sustained and on certiorari to the United States Supreme Court
the judgment for defendant was affirmed. The Court held that to
allow damages for the breach of such a restrictive covenant would
be state action depriving citizens of equal protection of the laws
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.'
This decision resolves the conflict among the states on the
question of whether allowing an action for damages for the
breach of a racial restrictive covenant is a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment.2 The problem can be best understood
in the light of its judicial history.
In 1917 it was held that a city ordinance which made it unlaw-
ful for a colored person to establish a residence in a block in
which the majority of the residences were occupied by white
people was not a legitimate exercise of the police power and
was unconstitutional under the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment because it deprived a property owner of the
right to sell his property to whomsoever he desired.3 After this
1. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953). This case went to the
United States Supreme Court from the California District Court of Appeals
on a writ of certiorari after the Supreme Court of California denied a
hearing.
2. This question has arisen in four cases besides the principal case since
1948 when Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), held that the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibited specific performance of such covenants. Weiss v.
Leaon, 359 Mo. 1054, 225 S.W.2d 127 (1949), and Correll v. Earley, 237
P.2d 1017 (Okla. 1951), both allowed the recovery of damages. Recovery
was denied in Roberts v. Curtis, 93 F. Supp. 604 (D.D.C. 1950), and
Phillips v. Naff, 332 Mich. 389, 52 N.W.2d 158 (1952).
3. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
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decision litigation involving restrictive covenants became prev-
alent. Such agreements were first sustained in 1918 when the
Missouri Supreme Court held that the common law prohibited
only permanent or total restraints on the alienation of land, and
that a covenant prohibiting the sale of land to a Negro foiz
twenty-five years was not void.4 The use of such agreements
was given further impetus by the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Corrigan v. Buckley5 that such agreementa
were not void under the Federal Constitution. It is important
to note, however, that the only question before the Court in
Corrigan v. Buckley was whether the restrictive covenant as.
such was void, and not whether its enforcement was contrary to
the United States Constitution.
With only one exception these racial restrictive agreements
were unanimously enforced until the Restrictive Covenant Cases7
were decided in 1948. Some states did refuse to enforce a cove-
nant not to sell to certain racial groups as being a restraint on
alienation,8 but every jurisdiction that considered the question
enforced covenants against the use or occupancy of the land." In
sustaining the constitutionality of these covenants the courts
usually said the Fourteenth Amendment applied to state action
only, and not to acts of private parties, that the enforcement of
private contracts was not within the state action prohibited by
the Amendment, and in some cases said that Corrigan v. Buckley
had held that such covenants were constitutional. 0
4. Koehler v. Rowland 275 Mo. 573, 205 S.W. 217 (1918).
5. 271 U.S. 323 (1926;.
6. Gandolfo v. Hartman, 49 Fed. 181, 182 (C.C.S.D. Cal. 1892). This
decision by Judge Ross was never appealed and has been little cited. The
brief opinion was remarkably prophetic of the decision in the principal case.
7. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24
(1948).
8. Los Angeles Investment Co. v. Gary, 181 Cal. 680, 186 Pac. 596 (1919) ;
Porter v. Barrett, 233 Mich. 373, 206 N.W. 532 (1925); White v. White,
108 W. Va. 128, 150 S.E. 531 (1929). Although the covenants not to sell
to certain racial groups were not upheld in these cases, covenants against
the use or occupancy of the land by certain racial groups were not in-
validated.
9. Parmalee v. Morris, 218 Mich. 625, 188 N.W. 330 (1922); Koehler v.
Rowland, 275 Mo. 573, 205 S.W. 217 (1918); Doherty v. Rice, 240 Wis.
389, 3 N.W.2d 734 (1942).
10. Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 136 La. 723, 67 So. 641 (1915);
Meade v. Dennistone 173 Md. 295, 196 Atl. 330 (1938); Parmalee v. Morris,
218 Mich. 625, 188 N.W. 330 (1922). The court in Meade v. Dennistone
cited Corigan -v. Buckley for the proposition that restrictive convenants
were not unconstitutional. Here again it should be remembered that Cor-
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In Shelley v. Kraemer," the plaintiffs sought to enjoin Shelley,
a Negro, from taking possession of land bound by a covenant
prohibiting use or occupancy by Negroes or Mongolians, and to
have the title revested in the immediate grantor. The Missouri
Supreme Court held the covenant was valid and that its enforce-
ment was not in violation of the Federal Constitution. A Michi-
gan case12 of similar facts and holding was joined with the Mis-
souri case for joint consideration by the United States Supreme
Court. That Court said that the restrictive covenants "standing
alone" were not violative of any rights ,protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment, and that there was clearly no state action
involved as long as the covenants were voluntarily adhered to,
but held that there was state action which violated the equal pro-
tection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when the courts
granted judicial enforcement of the agreement.13
Since Shelley v. Kraemer, four other cases have considered the
question in the principal case of whether an action for damages
could be maintained for breach of a restrictive covenant.-4 In
a case allowing recovery the Missouri Supreme Court held that
Shelley v. Kraemer had not ruled on the question and that the
fact that an action for specific performance was unconstitutional
did not necessarily mean that an action for damages was also
unconstitutional. 15 In a Michigan case, which denied recovery,
rigan v. Buckley only decided that such convenants were not void as such
and did not pass upon the question of whether the enforcement of such
restrictive covenants was contrary to the United States Constitution.
11. Cited as Kraemer v. Shelley, 355 Mo. 814, 198 S.W.2d 679 (1946).
12. Sipes v. McGhee, 316 Mich. 614, 25 N.W.2d 638 (1947).
13. These are not cases, as has been suggested, in which the States
have merely abstained from action, leaving private individuals free to
impose such discriminations as they see fit. Rather, these are cases in
which the States have made available to such individuals the full
coercive power of government to deny to petitioners, on the grounds of
race or color, the enjoyment of property rights in premises which peti-
tioners are willing and financially able to acquire and which the
grantors are willing to sell. The difference between judicial enforce-
ment and non-enforcement of the restrictive covenants is the difference
to petitioners between being denied rights of property available to other
members of the community and being accorded full enjoyment of those
rights on an equal footing.
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19 (1948).
14. Recovery denied in Weiss v. Leaon, 359 Mo. 1054, 225 S.W.2d 127(1949), and Correll v. Earley, 237 P.2d 1017 (Okla. 1951). Recovery was
denied in Roberts v. Curtis, 93 F. Supp. 604 (D.D.C. 1950), and Phillips v.
Naff, 332 Mich. 389, 52 N.W.2d 158 (1952).
15. Weiss v. Leaon, 359 Mo. 1054, 225 S.W.2d 127 (1949).
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the court pointed out the fallacy of denying an action for specific
performance and then allowing indirect enforcement of such a
restrictive covenant by allowing an action for damages." The
Court in the principal case adopts a view similar to that of the
Michigan court, concluding that to allow an action for damages
would be state action which would prevent non-Caucasians frorn
purchasing and enjoying property on an equal basis with Cau-
casians just as much as granting specific performance of such
a restrictive covenant.
The initial problem that confronted the Court in the principal
case was whether the plaintiff had standing to raise the con-
stitutional question." The late Chief Justice Vinson dissented
because he disagreed with the answer of the majority of the
Court to this problem. He maintains that since the Caucasian
vendor's constitutional rights would not be invaded by allowing
an action for damages for the breach of the restrictive covenant
she has no standing to raise the issue. 8 The Court simply states
that they are making an exception to this rule of practice. They
say very frankly, without any sophistry, that if this defendant
is not allowed to raise the issue, by the very nature of the situ-
ation no one would ever be able to raise the question, because it
is not possible for the real injured parties, the "unidentified but
identifiable" future non-Caucasian would-be purchasers, to pre-
sent their grievance in court. The Supreme Court made the big
step in nullifying restrictive covenants by its decision in Shelley
v. Kraemer, and the court is now in effect saying that they are
not going to allow the result of the decision in the Shelley case
to be abrogated because of a canon of judicial restraint.
The decision of the Court is a policy decision which is the
natural sequel to the earlier decision of the court in the Shelley
case. In this writer's opinion praise is deserved not only for
the policy adopted but also for the candor of its presentation.
16. Phillips v. Naff, 332 Mich. 389, 52 N.W.2d 158 (1952).
17. For a general discussion of "standing" and the requirements there-
for, see ROBERTSON AND KIRKHAI, JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREI COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES §§ 297, 298 (Wolfson and Kurland's ed. 1951).
18. See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 260 (1953) (dissenting opin-
ion).
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